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Labor Policy and the Great Recession: 
An Economist’s Perspective 
ELYCE ROTELLA
*
 
I begin with a disclaimer: I am not a lawyer. I am an economist—one who 
specializes in economic history and labor economics. I have been assured that an 
economist is what is wanted in this particular discussant slot. Still, as an outsider, I 
apologize in advance for my innocence of legal scholarship and perhaps also for 
my innocence of the folkways and etiquette of your tribe. 
I also begin with a thank you. I am grateful to be included in a conference where 
I have an opportunity to learn so much. When I was an undergraduate, my career 
goal was to be a lawyer—a lawyer who specialized in labor law. My ambition came 
in part from my background—I am the child of the industrial working class. My 
father worked in a steel mill, my mother worked in a meat-packing plant, my 
uncles all worked in coal mines or steel mills, and I grew up in the union hall. In 
college I found economics and took a turn away from the law. I replaced a passion 
for labor law with a passion for labor economics. This conference gives me a 
chance to see a bit of what I missed along the road not taken. 
I am struck by the question mark at the end of the title of the conference, A Time 
for Hope and Change?, and at the end of the title of this session, Can Obama Bail 
Out Workers? Indeed, those question marks are substantially more profound after 
the recent elections. As I understand the purpose of this first session, we are to 
focus on the economic landscape within which the possible (or hoped-for) change 
in labor conditions or employment law or both might take place under the Obama 
administration. 
Professor Flanagan gives us a primer on the economic analysis relevant to the 
labor market, organized sensibly around two issues: (1) the level of aggregate 
employment; and (2) the distribution of welfare—earnings and employment.1 To 
use the hackneyed metaphor, Flanagan looks at the size of the pie and how it is 
sliced up. Like any good primer, Flanagan’s is clear, concise, and teacherly. And 
like any good economics primer, the focus is on trade-offs. The simple insight at 
the center of all economic analysis is opportunity cost—in order to get something 
of value it is necessary to give up something else of value. That is, you can’t have it 
all. Economists are called dismal scientists for a good reason. 
Flanagan begins with the great macroeconomic trade-off at the center of the 
Keynesian model: policies that reduce unemployment put upward pressure on the 
price level—that is, they lead to inflation.2 He even introduces us to the 
nonaccelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU).
3
 Clearly the 
overwhelming problem in the American economy now is the stubbornly high rate 
of unemployment, which was stuck in October 2010 at 9.7% of the labor force—
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not much reduced from its high of 10.1% in October 2009.
4
 In the United States, 
we are well above NAIRU, and most (but not all) economists and bankers have 
stopped worrying about inflation.
5
  
Economists commonly divide unemployment into three types:  
(1) frictional unemployment: some degree of which is always present because it 
takes time for people to be matched to jobs. NAIRU reflects frictional 
unemployment;
6
 
(2) structural unemployment: comes from a disconnect between the 
characteristics of workers (e.g., their skills and location) and the characteristics that 
employers demand;
7
 
(3) cyclical unemployment: comes from weak aggregate demand associated with 
a downswing in the business cycle. The Great Recession is mostly about cyclical 
unemployment, though you can get arguments from people who see structural 
problems in the current situation.
8
 
Policies to combat cyclical unemployment come in two flavors: (1) deficit-
financed fiscal policy (increased government spending and lower government 
revenues) which necessarily leads to higher government deficits (Flanagan’s 
second trade-off); and (2) monetary policy (adjusting the quantity of money to 
lower interest rates).
9
  
That fiscal policy must necessarily lead to larger government deficits was 
stressed by John Maynard Keynes in an open letter to President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt on December 31, 1933: 
Thus, as the prime mover in the first stage of the technique of recovery, 
I lay overwhelming emphasis on the increase of national purchasing 
power resulting from governmental expenditure which is financed by 
loans and is not merely a transfer through taxation, from existing 
incomes. Nothing else counts in comparison with this.
10
 
Standard monetary policy focuses on short-term interest rates, but in the current 
Great Recession, aggressive monetary policy, operated by the Federal Reserve, 
lowered short-term interest rates to essentially zero by the end of 2008 without 
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producing much recovery. With the recent rejection of fiscal policy by the 
American electorate and the fact that the Fed has exhausted its options on short-
term rates, the Fed is now valiantly (or maybe foolishly) trying to reduce long-term 
rates through bond purchases (confusingly called quantitative easing). 
As Flanagan points out, the Obama administration has focused its attention on 
trying to increase aggregate output and employment through macroeconomic 
policy, and has not much pursued an active program of labor-market regulation or 
legal reform.
11
 Under the dire economic conditions we currently face, this emphasis 
on trying to goose the aggregate economy is understandable. It would not, however, 
be accurate to conclude that the Obama administration has been unconcerned with 
distributional issues. Health care reform, how much of the Bush tax cuts to keep, 
what to do about estate taxes, credit card reforms, consumer protection, mortgage 
market policies, and even financial sector regulation are all deeply distributional—
though they are not labor and employment law. In Professor Golden’s paper we 
also learn about distributional proposals coming out of the White House Task Force 
on Middle Class Working Families chaired by Vice President Biden.
12
 
Let’s look at three questions raised by Flanagan that focus directly on labor 
market policies. 
 Question 1: Do specific labor market policies reduce aggregate 
unemployment? 
After introducing us to the NAIRU, which mostly reflects frictions in labor 
markets, Flanagan provides a useful discussion of whether active labor market 
programs (ALMPs) can lower the NAIRU.
13
 Sweden has led the way in policies 
designed to provide information and training and to subsidize mobility, arguing that 
such policies would reduce NAIRU.
14
 By contrast, the United States does very little 
of this. I learned from the Flanagan paper that a recent meta-analysis led by the 
well-regarded economist David Card finds mixed results from such policies, with 
job-search-assistance programs having the biggest impact.
15
 We might all hope for 
the day when the United States is close enough to the NAIRU to want to engage in 
policies designed to lower it. 
 Question 2: Where does the power lie in the labor market? 
Flanagan reminds us that the outcome of the wage and working conditions 
bargain depends on the relative power of the suppliers and the demanders of 
labor.
16
 Workers will do better if there are lots of employers clamoring for their 
services, and employers will do better if there are lots of workers clamoring for 
their jobs. Anything that reduces competition among employers for workers’ 
services increases their power (called monopsony power
17
). Flanagan reports that 
last September, an antitrust settlement by the Justice Department reduced 
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monopsony power of Silicon Valley firms that had agreed not to recruit workers 
from other firms in the industry.
18
 Score one for greater competition! 
Question 3: What explains the stunning rise in productivity we have seen in 
the midst of the Great Recession?  
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research, the trough of the 
Great Recession occurred in June of 2009, and, even though the economy has now 
been heading up for sixteen months, unemployment has fallen very little. That total 
output (gross domestic product) has been growing without much increase in labor 
input usage (employment) means that output per unit of labor has increased. In 
general, we cheer for productivity growth, but in this case we worry because we are 
not getting the decline in unemployment we desire. 
Thinking about these last two issues, the relative bargaining power on the two 
sides of the labor market and the recent rise in productivity, leads me to some 
questions about interactions between the Great Recession and labor policies. These 
are questions that arose from thinking about both Professor Flanagan’s paper and 
Professor Golden’s paper. 
The higher productivity we see suggests that workers who do have jobs are 
working harder (and longer) in the high unemployment economy. It makes sense 
that under conditions of high unemployment (abundant labor supply), the balance 
of power in the labor market shifts in favor of employers. The effect on the wage is 
straightforward. Even if the nominal wage per hour does not fall, the implicit piece 
wage does fall because labor cost per unit of output declines. However, there are 
likely to be impacts beyond the wage. In the midst of a high unemployment 
economy, workers who still have jobs are more worried about losing them, and 
unemployed workers are more anxious to find jobs. Under such conditions of 
heightened anxiety I expect that workers are less vigilant about possible 
deterioration of working conditions (e.g., safety, pace of work, hours, and perks) 
and that employers may be more likely to violate rules (e.g., safety or overtime). 
We might also see that the higher relative power on the demand side of the labor 
market increases employers’ ability to choose workers they prefer on non-
productivity grounds—that is, there may be a rise in favoritism and discrimination. 
All this suggests to me that enforcement of labor law and regulations may be even 
more important during periods of high unemployment and that a conference like 
this one is particularly valuable now.  
Professor Golden has written a big paper. In the first half of his paper, he too 
provides a useful primer—focused on the empirical side and a nice complement to 
Professor Flanagan’s review of theory.19 Golden pulls together the facts and 
presents them in a series of graphs and tables that show us details of the 
unemployment situation in the Great Recession and what has happened to 
compensation and the distribution of income.
20
 He shows the long-term downward 
trend in labor’s share of total compensation and the recent spike in productivity.21 It 
is a bounty of data, and I suspect that all of us will be grateful to print out this paper 
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and have these facts nicely pulled together in one place. He then goes on to 
consider a dizzying variety of policies (taxes, education, regulation, health 
insurance, family-flexibility, gender equity, and work sharing) and finishes with a 
list of proposed legislation.
22
 
I’m going to pick out just one from his list to focus on—education, and I want to 
recommend to you a wonderful book that looks deeply at the question of what 
determines the size and distribution of the pie: The Race Between Education and 
Technology by Claudia Goldin and Lawrence F. Katz.
23
 Underlying long-run 
economic growth is education—no surprise there. But you might be surprised at the 
link between education and changes in distribution. Goldin and Katz show that 
greater equality in the mid-twentieth century was associated with rapid increases in 
the supply of educated workers, which lowered their relative wage.
24
 The widening 
income distribution since the 1970s is associated with attenuated growth in 
education so that the supply of educated workers has risen more slowly than the 
demand for educated workers, which increases their relative scarcity and therefore 
their compensation.
25
 I leave you with an assertion. If the Obama administration is 
to deliver hope and change to bail out workers, the most important thing it can do is 
invest in education. 
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